The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill: Balancing Accountability and Political Misuse

UPSC Relevance; Prelims: Article 75, Constitutional Morality, Due Process,Mains-GS Paper 2: Indian Constitution, Accountability in Governance, Separation of Powers, Criminalisation of Politics

Why in News

The Union government has introduced The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025 in Parliament to amend Articles 75, 164, and 239AA—relating to the Union, State, and Delhi Councils of Ministers. The Bill, now referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), has sparked debate over ministerial accountability, constitutional morality, and risks of political misuse.

Background

The Bill arises from concerns over the criminalisation of politics—with ADR (2024) reporting that 43% of MPs face criminal cases, including 29% for serious offences. Though the Supreme Court in Public Interest Foundation vs Union of India (2018) mandated disclosure of candidates’ criminal records, it stopped short of disqualification. The Amendment seeks to bar ministers facing serious charges from holding office indefinitely, but critics fear executive overreach and selective targeting of Opposition leaders.

Key Provisions of the Bill

  1. Automatic Removal:A Minister arrested and detained for 30 consecutive days for an offence punishable with five years or more imprisonment must be removed by the President or Governor.
  2. Executive Advice Mechanism:The Prime Minister/Chief Minister must advise the President/Governor to remove such a Minister by the 31st day of custody.
  3. Self-Resignation Clause:If the PM or CM themselves are detained under similar conditions, they must resign by the 31st day, failing which they automatically cease to hold office.

Arguments in Favour of the Bills

  1. Upholding Constitutional Morality:As highlighted in Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014), constitutional morality requires ethical conduct in governance, discouraging appointment of individuals with serious criminal charges as Ministers.
  2. Enhancing Public Trust:The Bill reinforces public faith in democratic institutions by taking a firm stance against corruption and the criminalization of politics.
  3. Ensuring Good Governance:It prevents scenarios of “governance from jail,” ensuring executive accountability and adherence to constitutional principles.
  4. Bridging Legal Gaps:The Representation of the People Act disqualifies only after conviction; this Bill fills the gap by addressing the interim period of arrest or detention.
  5. Parity with Civil Services:Since government employees are suspended after 48 hours in custody, similar accountability standards should logically extend to Ministers.
  6. Political and Ethical Reform:The Bill promotes political decriminalization, applies uniform standards across parties, and balances concerns of frivolous arrests through judicial scrutiny.

Concerns and Criticism

1. Fear of Misuse and Political Targeting

  • Though intended to promote clean politics, the provision could be misused for political vendetta through motivated arrests.
  • The National Police Commission (1977) found that nearly 60% of arrests in India were unnecessary or unjustified.
  • In Arnesh Kumar vs State of Bihar (2014), the Supreme Court directed police to arrest only when essential, but this is often ignored.
  • Given the politicisation of police and central agencies like the ED and CBI, even a mere arrest could be used to dislodge Opposition ministers, providing a “legal shortcut” to destabilize governments and undermine federal balance.

2. The 30-Day Custody Rule: A Flawed Benchmark

  • The proposed 30-day custody clause for ministerial removal has legal and practical flaws:
    • (a) Default Bail Conflict:
       Under Section 167(2) CrPC / Section 187 BNSS, default bail is available after 60–90 days. Hence, removing a minister after 30 days punishes before due process.
    • (b) Routine Remand Extensions:
       Courts often extend judicial custody up to 90 days, making 30 days arbitrary.
    • (c) Special Laws’ Stringency:
      Laws like PMLA, NDPS, and UAPA make bail difficult, so mere accusation could trigger removal.
      Example: In the Manish Sisodia liquor policy case, bail was granted only after 17 months under PMLA — showing how long detentions can last without conviction.

3. Violation of Presumption of Innocence and Natural Justice

  • The Bill contradicts the legal principle of “innocent until proven guilty”, as it mandates removal on detention alone, not conviction.
  • In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that disqualification begins only after conviction, not on arrest.
  • Similarly, in Kartar Singh (1994), the Court reaffirmed presumption of innocence as a human right under Article 21.
    Therefore, the Amendment risks criminalising suspicion rather than proven guilt.

4. Inconsistency in Treatment and Constitutional Paradox

  • There exists a double standard between legislators and ministers:
    • Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, MPs/MLAs are disqualified only upon conviction.
    • Under this Bill, ministers lose office on arrest alone.
  • This creates a constitutional paradox where a convicted legislator might remain eligible longer than an arrested minister, defying logic and fairness.

5. Bail and the Minister’s Dilemma

  • A detained minister faces a no-win situation:
    • Staying in office may delay bail, as courts fear influence over witnesses.
    • Resigning implies political guilt, even before trial.
  • Since bail decisions vary with judicial discretion, the Amendment’s operation could be uneven and biased.

6. “Revolving Door” and Political Instability

  • The provision allowing reappointment after release may lead to cycles of resignation and reinstatement, creating administrative uncertainty.
  • This could encourage tactical arrests or legal manipulation to influence power dynamics, undermining stable governance.

7. Executive Discretion and Politicization

  • The dual mechanism of removal — either by PM/CM’s advice or automatic cessation — risks politicizing constitutional offices.
  • A Prime Minister could shield allies or target rivals, while a Chief Minister may face removal on partisan grounds.
  • Such discretion threatens the principle of separation of powers and cooperative federalism.

8. Lack of Safeguards and High Misuse Potential

  • The Bill provides no safeguard or compensation if the arrest is later found malicious or politically motivated.
  • This opens space for misuse of preventive detention laws like UAPA (1967) and PMLA (2002), where conviction rates remain extremely low.
  • For instance, out of nearly 5,000 ED cases in the past five years, convictions are below 10%, revealing a high potential for abuse.

9. Constitutional and Ethical Dilemmas

  • The Bill raises serious questions about constitutional morality, due process, and democratic accountability:

    • Can arrest without conviction justify removal from elected office?
    • Does executive discretion undermine the separation of powers?
    • Will it establish a dangerous precedent for political vendetta?

The core dilemma lies in reconciling public morality and accountability with individual liberty and democratic representation.

Way Forward

  1. Link Removal to Framing of Charges:Disqualification or suspension should occur only after a court frames charges, ensuring judicial verification of prima facie evidence and preventing misuse.
  2. Judicial Oversight Mechanism:Any removal or suspension must be subject to judicial review—preferably by a High Court bench or independent tribunal—to prevent arbitrary or politically motivated action.
  3. Interim Suspension Instead of Removal:Instead of outright dismissal, temporary suspension of ministerial duties during trial can balance governance continuity with accountability.
  4. Time-Bound Investigations and Trials:Criminal investigations and trials involving Ministers should be completed within a fixed timeline (e.g., 60 days) to ensure both speed and fairness.
  5. Clarify Executive Role:The President or Governor should act strictly based on judicial findings, not political advice, to uphold constitutional checks and balances.
  6. Political Party Accountability:Parties must adopt internal codes of ethics, suspend members facing serious charges, and avoid nominating candidates with criminal backgrounds.
  7. Law Commission Recommendation:Implement the suggestion that framing of charges for offences punishable with five or more years be a valid ground for disqualification—ensuring judicial scrutiny before any action.
  8. Bail as a Norm:Make bail the rule (except in heinous crimes) to prevent the misuse of arrest provisions for political targeting.
  9. Fast-Track Criminal Cases:Prioritize speedy trials of serious cases involving Ministers rather than automatic disqualification on arrest.
  10. Independent Review Panel:Create an independent judicial or quasi-judicial review body to assess if removal conditions are met, preventing executive overreach.

Conclusion

The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025 is a well-intentioned yet legally fragile attempt to restore faith in public life. While it seeks to prevent tainted Ministers from holding office, its current design risks eroding due process, federal principles, and personal liberty.

As the Supreme Court has often reminded, “bail is the rule, jail the exception” — and by extension, justice must precede punishment.
Parliament must therefore refine this Amendment to ensure that ethical governance and constitutional justice go hand in hand, safeguarding both integrity in politics and individual rights.

UPSC Prelims Practice Questions

Question1. With reference to the Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025, consider the following statements:
  1. The Bill seeks to amend Articles 75, 164, and 239AA of the Constitution.
  2. It provides that if a Minister is arrested and detained for 30 consecutive days for an offence punishable with imprisonment of five years or more, he shall automatically cease to hold office.
  3. The provision of removal applies only to Union Ministers and not to State Ministers.

Which of the statements given above are correct?

A. 1 and 2 only
 B. 2 and 3 only
 C. 1 and 3 only
 D. 1, 2 and 3

Answer: A. 1 and 2 only

Explanation:The Amendment Bill covers Articles 75 (Union Ministers), 164 (State Ministers), and 239AA (Delhi Ministers). It introduces automatic cessation of office if a Minister remains in custody for 30 days for serious offences. Thus, Statement 3 is incorrect since it also applies to State Ministers.

Question 2; Consider the following judicial pronouncements:

  1. Arnesh Kumar vs State of Bihar (2014) — Directed police to record reasons for arrest to prevent arbitrary detention.
  2. Public Interest Foundation vs Union of India (2018) — Mandated disqualification of all legislators upon framing of charges.
  3. Joginder Kumar vs State of U.P. (1994) — Held that arrest must be justified and cannot be made merely because it is lawful to do so.

Which of the statements given above are correct?

A. 1 and 3 only
 B. 1 and 2 only
 C. 2 and 3 only
 D. 1, 2 and 3

Answer: A. 1 and 3 only

Explanation:While Arnesh Kumar (2014) and Joginder Kumar (1994) safeguard personal liberty by restricting arbitrary arrests, Public Interest Foundation (2018) did not order automatic disqualification upon framing of charges — it only urged political parties to ensure transparency and ethical candidate selection.

Mains Practice Question

Question:The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025 seeks to enhance political accountability by disqualifying Ministers detained in custody for 30 consecutive days. However, critics warn it may erode due process and personal liberty.Discuss the constitutional, legal, and ethical dimensions of this proposed amendment. Suggest measures to ensure a balance between political morality and protection against executive overreach.(250 words, 15 marks)

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